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THE DUE-ON CLAUSE:
A PREEMPTION CONTROVERSY
Whether the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses' contained in loan
instruments executed between federal savings and loan associations and
California residents should be governed by federal or state law is an
issue raised in some thirty cases currently pending in federal district
court for the Central District of California. 2 These cases have arisen
1. The "due-on-sale," "due-on-encumbrance," and "acceleration" clauses, all collec-
tively referred to as the "due-on" clause, are provisions in loan instruments which give.
the lender the option to declare due and payable all remaining installments if the bor-
rower sells, conveys, transfers, encumbers, or in any other way alienates his title to
the mortgaged property without the prior written consent of the lender. 1 H. MILLER &
M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 3:66, at 103 (1975) [herein-
after cited as MILLER & StARR]. A due-on clause may be phrased as follows:
If trustor shall sell, convey, or alienate the premises, or any part thereof, or any
interest therein, or shall be divested of his title or any interest therein in any man-
ner, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, without the prior written consent of bene-
ficiary, or if default is made in the payment of any principal or interest payable
under the secured [note or bond] or in the performance of the covenants
or agreements hereof, or any of them, beneficiary shall have the right at its option
to declare any indebtedness or obligations secured hereby, irrespective of the ma-
turity date specified in the [note or bond] evidencing the same, immedi-
ately due and payable.
13 AM. Jun. LEGAL Foxms 2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 179:255 (1971).
2. Ostern v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 76-2415 (C.D. Cal., filed
Aug. 7, 1976); Burgess v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 76-1179 (C.D. Cal.,
filed April 12, 1976); Parham v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 76-1069
(C.D. Cal., filed April 1, 1976); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lasher, Civ.
No. 76-829 (C.D. Cal., filed March 15, 1976); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Woeltjen, Civ. No. 76-828 (C.D. Cal., filed March 15, 1976); Preston v. Fidelity Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 76-600 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 23, 1976); California Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fewins, Civ. No. 76-555 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 19, 1976); Cal-
ifornia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Beall, Civ. No. 76-554 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 19,
1976); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Harding, Civ. No. 76-533 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Feb. 19, 1976); Hall v. Pomona First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 76-528
(C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 17, 1976); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lightfoot, Civ.
No. 76-492 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 11, 1976); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Hendrix, Civ. No. 76-491 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 11 1976); California Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Lockwood, Civ. No. 76-478 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 10, 1976); California Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Diniz, Civ. No. 76-477 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 10, 1976); California
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Baty, Civ. No. 76-456 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 9, 1976); Cal-
ifornia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ryan, Civ. No. 76-455 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 9,
1976); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Griebahn, Civ. No. 76-454 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Feb. 9, 1976); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mastrangelo, Civ. No. 76-
453 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 9, 1976); Cancray Dev., Inc. v. Pomona First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 76-450 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 9, 1976); California Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Horn, Civ. No. 76-238 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 21, 1976); California
v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 76-162 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 14, 1976);
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against a background of diversely reasoned state and federal court de-
cisions. None of these, however, has focused on the precise issue of
whether Congress has preempted the area of the due-on clause.8
In recent California decisions, courts considering the enforceability
of the due-on clause have held that a state association could not exer-
cise its rights under the clause to accelerate mortgage payments when
the borrower had entered into an installment sale contract4 or had exe-
cuted a junior encumbrance5 absent an affirmative showing that the
transfer enhanced the likelihood of waste or risk of default.( The
courts deemed insufficient the commercial justification advanced by the
associations that the clause was a necessary economic tool by which to
adjust their loan portfolios to current interest levels.7
Although no California court has yet decided whether the clause is
enforceable in an "outright sale" situation," the federal associations are
understandably reluctant to submit to California jurisdiction where re-
cent, unfavorable decisions have been rendered against the associa-
tions.9 Consequently, the federal associations argue that Califor-
Putman v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 76-005 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan.
2, 1976); Belt v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 75-4102 (C.D. Cal., filed
Dec. 8, 1975); Pittman v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 75-4052 (C.D.
Cal., filed Dec. 3, 1975); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crane, Civ. No. 75-3764
(C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 10, 1975); Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No.
75-366 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 4, 1975).
3. The issue has, however, been raised in dicta in a recent case. Crockett v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 224 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. 1976).
4. Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1974). An installment sale contract is one which provides for periodic re-
tirement of the debt where the seller retains title to the property. MILLER & STARR,
supra note 1, § 2:33.
5. La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1971).
6. Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 639, 526 P.2d 1169, 1175,
116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (1974).
7. For a discussion of this argument, see notes 53-70 infra and accompanying text.
8. "By the term 'outright sale' we refer to a transaction wherein the seller receives
full payment from and transfers legal title to the buyer." Tucker v. Lassen Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 634 n.6, 526 P.2d 1169, 1172 n.6, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633,
636 n.6 (1974). The issue has, however, been resolved in an unpublished trial court
opinion. Austin v. Calamars, No. 360231 (Super. Ct. San Diego, Cal., Sept. 16, 1975),
digested in Freshman, Tucker v. Lassen and the Future of Acceleration, 8 U.W.L.A.L.
REv. 57, 63 (1976) (showing of impaired security interest required even in an outright
sale situation).
9. Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1164, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1974); La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d
1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971). For a recent application of Tucker, see Demey v.
Joujon-Roche, 63 Cal. App. 3d 178, 133 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1976), in which the court
refused to enforce a due-on clause when the borrower had entered into an installment
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nia law is inapplicable because the field of due-on clauses has been
preempted by federal law. Such result obtains from the promulgation
of regulations governing enforcement of acceleration clauses by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the Board), an agency empowered
by Congress to issue regulations governing the incorporation and regu-
lation of federal savings and loan assocations.1° Moreover, should the
pronouncements of the Board prove insufficient to preempt state law,
the argument runs, preemption may nonetheless result from application
of more general preemption-by-occupation principles enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court.
This Comment will assess the implications of a regulation recently
promulgated by the Board purporting to resolve issues relating to the
exercise of acceleration clauses. It will then explore the possibility of
preemption through more general Board-promulgated regulations and
through occupation of the field by Congress. The final portion will
trace the national development of acceleration clauses with a view to-
ward formulating a statement reflecting present federal common law.
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION THROUGH REGULATORY LAW
Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,1'
preemption of state law may occur by specific regulation 2 or where
Congress has manifested an intent to occupy a particular field.' 3
sale contract absent a showing of impairment to the lender's security interest. Cf.
Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969)
(exercise of due-on clause for sole purpose of increasing interest rate upheld as not
imposing unreasonable restraint on alienation; Cherry was disapproved in Tucker); Hell-
baum v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969)
(prepayment penalty provision triggered by exercise of due-on clause upheld as not im-
posing an unreasonable restraint on alienation).
In addition, CA.. CIV. CODE § 2929.6 (West Supp. 1977), with respect to residential
housing, prohibits exercise in the following situations (whether or not the borrower
lives or intends to live on the property): death of a spouse when the other is also
an obligor (regardless of whether the property was held in joint tenancy or in tenancy
in common), transfer by one spouse to another when the other becomes a co-obligor
(i.e., upon marriage), transfer to an inter vivos trust, and execution of a junior encum-
brance. Any waiver of these provisions is void. Id. See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-11(d)
to (g), 556.9(a) to (e) (1977), discussed in notes 17-25 infra and accompanying text.
Finally, three bills are pending in the California legislature, two attempting to forbid
the acceleration merely for the purpose of increasing interest rates and one permitting
acceleration specifically for this purpose. A.B. 3278 (1975-76 Reg. Sess.); A.B. 4416
(1975-76 Reg. Sess.); A.B. 3951 (1975-76 Reg. Sess.).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a), (d) (Supp. V 1975).
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. See, e.g., Myers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th
Cir. 1974).
13. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501 (1956); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
With respect to the federal associations, preemption by regulation may
potentially be derived from the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933
(HOLA) ,14 under which the federal associations are organized, char-
tered, and operated. In addition, HOLA provides for creation of the
Board which is empowered with all regulatory and supervisory author-
ity over the associations. 15 The purposes of the Act were to establish
a nationally uniform system of savings and loan associations in order
to provide a convenient and safe method for the public to save and
invest money as well as a ready source of economic, long-term home
financing.16
A. The Due-On Regulation
On May 3, 1976, the Board promulgated the "Due-On Regulation,"'"
effective July 31, 1976,18 which authorizes use of due-on clauses by
federal associations. The regulation provides in part:
[A] Federal association continues to have the power to include, as a
matter of contract between it and the borrower a provision in its loan
instrument whereby the association may, at its option, declare im-
mediately due and payable all of the sums secured by the association's
security instrument if all or any part of the real property securing the
loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the association's
prior consent [and] exercise by an association of such an acceleration
option ... shall be governed exclusively by the terms of the con-
tract ...and all rights and remedies ... thereto shall be fixed
and governed by said contract. 19
Although the regulation clearly reflects the Board's desire to permit use
of the clause, ambiguities in the regulation suggesting a retroactive ef-
fect raise new problems to replace those it solves.
An initial ambiguity lies in the "continuing authority" language,
implying that the clause has always been approved by the Board, and
York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 772 (1947); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 350 (1943).
14. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (Supp. V 1975).
15. Although the Constitution does not specifically empower Congress to create and
maintain federal savings and loan associations, congressional power to do so is not
disputed since, for more than 150 years, the Supreme Court has recognized the implied
power of Congress to create and maintain banks and other federal financial institutions.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); Larwood Co. v. San Diego Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 185
Cal. App. 2d 450, 456, 8 Cal. Rptr. 362, 366 (1960).
16. 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1970).
17. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(d) to (g) (1977). The term is the author's.
18. Id. § 556.9.
19. Id. § 545.6-11(f).
[Vol. 10
DUE-ON CLAUSE
that the blessing of the Due-On Regulation extends to all loans, even
those executed prior to its effective date. Moreover, the regulation
forbids the imposition of a prepayment penalty in conjunction with the
exercise of an acceleration clause only as to borrower-occupied home
loans made after July 31, 1976; the joint use of both provisions is dis-
cretionary with regard to loans made prior to July 31, 1976.20 Since
prepayment penalty provisions used in conjunction with acceleration
clauses are expressly permitted in loan instruments executed prior
to the effective date of the regulation, acceleration clauses are, by impli-
cation, also permitted prior to that date.
A further ambiguity concerns the associations' power to exercise the
clause under certain circumstances after the effective date of the regu-
lation on loans executed prior to its effective date. Section 545.6-
11(g) prohibits enforcement of the clause where title is transferred by
the creation of a junior encumbrance, by the creation of a purchase
money security interest in household appliances, by a joint tenant, or by
the grant of any lease for a period of less than three years which does
not contain a purchase option.21  The enumerated exceptions affect
only those loans made after July 31, 1976;22 with respect to loans made
prior to that date, there are no express circumstances under which the
clause cannot be exercised. Consequently, the failure of the Board to
provide for loans made prior to the effective date of the regulation may,
on the one hand, reflect the Board's desire to free pre-effective date
loans from regulation. On the other hand, the silence of the Board
may evidence concern over extraneous matters2 and thus not reflect
any intent to free loans made prior to the effective date from the pur-
view of the regulation.
The conclusion that the Due-On Regulation applies to loan instru-
ments executed prior to its effective date is disconcerting, for this ren-
ders nugatory the effective date of the regulation.24 If the Board really
intended that the regulation apply to pre-July 31, 1976 contracts, one
20. Id. § 556.9(b)(1).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Such extraneous matters may inlude a concern over potential due process consid-
erations if the regulation has a retroactive effect. Letter from Daniel Goldberg, Act-
ing General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, to John Richmond (Feb. 15,
1977).
24. The Supreme Court has long disfavored granting statutes and regulations retroac-
tive effect absent express provision or unequivocal implication in the statute or regula-
tion itself. See Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435 (1935); Twenty Per Cent. Cases,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 179 (1873); United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399 (1806).
19771
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can only speculate as to the reason for obscuring that intent by
including an effective date. In any event, the Due-On Regulation has
yet to be judicially tested. If it is ultimately held inapplicable to loans
executed prior to its effective date,25 the great nucleus of outstanding
home loans will remain unregulated. Despite this, preemption may
still result from other regulations promulgated by the Board.
B. Other Regulations
The rule-making authority of the Board extends not only to the regu-
lation of "internal" matters, but also to "the organization, incorporation,
examination, operation and regulation of associations,' 26 language
which may confer on the Board the implied power to regulate all
matters affecting the stability and efficiency of the associations. How-
ever, the provision directing the Board to give "primary consideration
to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home financing institu-
tions" 27 would seem to imply that matters of state law are persuasive
in those areas common to both federal and state associations.
In a similar vein, another regulation provides that each loan "shall be
secured . . . as is in keeping with sound lending practices. The loan
contract shall provide for full protection to the Federal Association .
. . .*"28 The regulation then enumerates the specific means by which
such protection shall be realized:. by insurance, taxes, assessments, re-
pairs, and life insurance. 20  There is, however, no mention of the due-
on clause; hence, the "full protection" language may be too general
to cover specific issues other than those enumerated. The final sentence
of the regulation provides that "all loan instruments shall comply
with applicable provisions of law,"'30 but no mention is made as to
whether such provisions are federal or state. 1
For a discussion of the constitutional ramifications of determining that a statute or
regulation is retroactive, see Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality
of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 692 (1960); Comment, Federal Regulation
of "Substantial Product Hazards": An Analysis of Section 15 of the Consumer Product
Safety Act, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 717 (1976).
25. See note 3 supra.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. V 1975).
27. Id.
28. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6(a) (1977).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Cf. Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 240 N.W.2d 367 (Wis. 1974)
(where regulation provides that federal associations are to act according to "statute"
or "applicable law," such regulation refers to federal law and statutes, id. at 371).
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I. PREEMPTION BY OCCUPATION
Since the Due-On Regulation relates only by implication to loan in-
struments executed prior to July 31, 1976, a real possibility exists that
the regulation will constitute an ineffective basis for preemption by
regulation with respect to such loans. Moreover, other regulations pro-
mulgated by the Board are possibly too general to support preemption
by regulation. As to pre-July 31, 1976 loan instruments, then, pre-
emption will occur only if Congress has manifested an intent to occupy
the field.
Such intent may be manifested by express provision. 2 Absent such
provision, the inquiry becomes more difficult and has been the subject
of nebulous and confusing litigation.3 3 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has identified three bases from which an intent to occupy may
be determined: (1) if the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive
that Congress has left no room for the states to act; (2) if the field
is one in which the interests of the federal government are so dominant
that state action is precluded; or (3) if the enforcement of state law
would present serious conflicts with the administration of the federal
program.3 4
A. A Pervasive Scheme
While the highly regulated nature of the federal associations is re-
flected in the provisions of HOLA, and the regulations promulgated
thereunder, courts have differed, depending upon the area of regu-
lation involved, on whether a sufficiently pervasive scheme is present.
In disputes involving the internal affairs35 of the associations, courts
have uniformly found a pervasive scheme, even in the absence of an
express regulation.30 Thus, in Murphy v. Colonial Federal Savings &
32. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (Supp. V 1975), which provides that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp.
V 1975), supercedes all state laws regulating pension programs.
33. See San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959).
34. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956). For an excellent analysis
of the case, see Hunt, State Control of Sedition: The Smith Act as the Supreme Law
of the Land, 41 MINN. L. REv. 287 (1957).
35. For a discussion of "internal affairs," see notes 44-55 infra and accompanying
text.
36. See, e.g., Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir.
1967); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); City First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644 (E.D.
Wis. 1975); Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 240 N.W.2d 367 (Wis. 1974).
Cf. Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D.
1977]
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Loan Association,3" shareholder-depositors sought to overturn an elec-
tion of opposing directors because of management's denial of the share-
holders' request to inspect the association's shareholder list. To defeat
federal jurisdiction, the association urged that the shareholders' claim
was founded on state law. Although no regulation on point had been
promulgated,"8 the court noted that shareholder inspection rights in-
volve the internal affairs of the association, and ruled that when courts
"deal with the internal affairs 'of federal savings and loan associations
. . . they are. . . applying federal law."3 9
In areas not involving internal affairs, however, preemption has been
determined according to whether a regulation governing the specific
activity involved is present. Illustrative is Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association,40 where a prepayment penalty clause
in the loan agreement of a federal association was upheld against a
charge that the clause ran afoul of a local statute which prohibited
liquidated damages. The court ruled that an existing federal regu-
lation directly on point4 preempted the state prohibition. In a similar
vein, courts have held that, absent a specific regulation governing the
challenged activity, state law governed in such areas as the charging
of usurious interest rates,42 and the conversion of state to federally
chartered associations. 3
The clear implication of the Meyers line of cases is a rejection of
the notion that a pervasive scheme is present. These cases further sug-
gest that the gamut of activities engaged in by an association do not fall
within one "field" for preemption purposes but rather comprise two
"fields," one composed of internal affairs, and the second of all other
activities of the association. While Congress has generated a pervasive
scheme of control over the "internal affairs" field, such a scheme is
lacking for other activities.
Given this distinction, there is considerable incentive present to label
exercise of the due-on clause an internal affair. Since all borrowers
Ill. 1974) (although there was no specific regulation vesting the Board with the power
to approve "branching" of federal associations, implied authority of Board to do so
held to preempt state statutes prohibiting "branching").
37. 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967).
38. Id. at 612 n.2. The court implied a right to inspect from a regulation permitting
members to vote by proxy. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(4) (1977).
39. 388 F.2d at 612.
40. 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974).
41. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b) (1977).
42. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Norwood Realty Co., 93 S.E.2d 763 (Ga. 1956).
43. Hopkins Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
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are members of the lender association"4 and acquire various rights upon
their membership,45 an attempt by a borrower-member to substitute
another in his stead is thus a matter affecting relations of the new
member vis-a-vis existing members and the association; hence, an inter-
nal affair.40 In like manner, since the associations typically have the
right to pass on the acceptability of new members, this, too, constitutes
an internal affair.47 Upon examination, however, the "internal affairs"
argument proves specious.48
One result of labeling an activity an internal affair is to require that
all disputes involving that activity be initially litigated through adminis-
trative remedies.4 9 The Board, however, is ill-equiped to handle liti-
gative action; it is an administrative body and has as its chief function,
not the resolution of disputes, but the oversight of the federal asso-
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) permits the associations to require, by
corporate charter, all "obligors" of the association to become members. By regulation,
the Board requires all new associations to adopt Charter N, which provides, among
other things, that all savers and borrowers are members. 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a) (4)
(1977).
45. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b) (i) (Supp. V 1975).
46. Advisory Opinion of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, at 18, Schott v. Mission
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 75-366 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 4, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Advisory Opinion]. The Advisory Opinion resembles an amicus curiae brief
and was submitted at the request of the defendant, Mission Federal, in conjunction with
its response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
47. Id.
48. The "membership" argument is viable only where the assuming party is not al-
ready a member of the federal association. Where the assuming party is already a
member, the association will, of course, seek to enforce the due-on clause, but must
assert other grounds. See, e.g., Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 224 S.E.2d
580, 583 (N.C. 1976).
49. Where a statute provides an administrative remedy, such remedy must be ex-
hausted prior to resort to the courts. First Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs,
264 U.S. 450 (1923); Abelleira v. District Ct. of App., 17 Cal. 2d 280, 109 P.2d 942
(1943). HOLA provides such a remedy through its administrative hearing process. 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2)(A) (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 508.13 (1977). Accordingly, a dispute
over matters concerned with the internal affairs of the associations must be aired before
the Board prior to resort to judicial relief. See Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee,
196 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1952) (district court order enjoining administrative hearing adju-
dicating appropriateness of appointment of receiver because of alleged mismanagement
of the association held improper); California v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F.
Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (action to enjoin federal association from advertising in
contravention of state law; held exhaustion of administrative remedies required); Reich
v. Webb, 218 Cal. App. 2d 862, 32 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1963) (action to recover profits
of association misappropriated by directors held prematurely brought for lack of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies); Woodard v. Broadway, 111 Cal. App. 2d 218, 244
P.2d 467 (1952) (action to overturn election of board of directors; held exhaustion
of administrative remedies a prerequisite).
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ciations. ° Moreover, inclusion of the due-on clause as an internal af-
fair would extend that term beyond its recognized bounds, since the
term "internal affairs" has traditionally been used to connote the re-
lations inter se of the directors, officers, members, and association.
Thus, disputes involving fiduciary duties owed by directors and of-
ficers to the association5 and inspection rights of the members 12 have
been labeled internal affairs. In contrast, in a case involving a prepay-
ment penalty clause, the dispute significantly was not referred to as one
involving an internal affair. 53 Just as the prepayment penalty clause
affects the relations between association and borrower, so also does ex-
ercise of the due-on clause. While one individual is often both a
borrower and a member,54 the roles are justifiably distinct.
B. Dominant Federal Interests and Conflict
The presence of dominant federal interests as well as potential con-
flict with federal programs is reflected in the operation of the secondary
mortgage market, the process by which both federal and state associa-
tions buy and sell mortgages to increase or release part of their cash
flow.55 California associations tend to be sellers of mortgages because
of the rapid turnover of property loans within the state.50 Concomi-
tantly, associations in states having a high volume of savings and a lower
turnover of property tend to be buyers of mortgages. 57 If enforcement
of the due-on clause is greatly restricted, California loans may become
less marketable in the secondary mortgage market, since the loans can-
not be refinanced at current interest levels during the life of the loan.5 8
50. 12 C.F.R. § 500.2 (1977). The regulation details the Board's functions as includ-
ing the prescribing of rules regulating loans, deposit accounts, advertising, and chartering
of federal associations. No mention is made of resolving disputes between members
and associations; instead, the functions of the Board are couched in terms of promul-
gating rules and regulations.
51. See, e.g., Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819
(N.D. IM. 1975).
52. See, e.g., Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir.
1967).
53. Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974).
54. See note 44 supra.
55. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723d (1970).
56. Interview with Donald Klink, Vice President, Coast Federal Savings and Loan
Association, in Los Angeles (July 18, 1976).
57. Id.
58. The Office of Economic Research views the revocation of the "due-on sale
clause" as a factor that will lead to higher mortgage interest rates and will reduce
the marketability of such mortgages in the secondary market. .. . mhe due-on
sale clause is an important part of the mortgage contract throughout the country,
and its revocation sets a dangerous precedent in terms of the consequences in the
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Maintaining the saleability of California loans would appear to be an
integral part of the federal scheme regulating federal associations;
hence, an attempt by a state to proscribe exercise of acceleration
clauses would necessarily conflict with that scheme.
Further.conflict may flow from the effect of denial of due-on clause
enforcement on the ability of the federal associations to maintain loan
portfolios at current interest levels. California law permits both federal
and state associations to use variable interest rates,59 but such use on
residential loans is denied the federal associations under federal law.6
If the due-on clause is also denied the federal associations, the asso-
ciations would be locked into long-term mortgage investments without
realistic means to adjust portfolios to current levels.6' There are
three alternative methods generally employed to adjust portfolios
(aside from variable interest rates and due-on clauses): (1) short-term
balloon payment loans,6  (2) short-term amortized loans, 63 and (3)
long-term fixed interest amortized loans at a higher-than-market rate.64
mortgage market.
Opinion of the Office of Economic Research on the Revocation of the Due-on-Sale
Clause in the State of California, at 1, Schott v. Mission Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Civ.
No. 75-366 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 4, 1975).
59. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1977). A variable interest rate is an
interest rate which may be adjusted by means of an external economic indicator during
the life of the loan to meet the current market rate. 60 A.L.R.3d 473, 474 (1974).
The federal associations employ an index maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank and
calculated separately for each region. Downward adjustment is mandatory when the
index falls below a prevailing level and upward adjustment is optional when the prevail-
ing level exceeds the loan rate by a set amount. Affidavit of David L. Smith, Chief
Economist and Vice President, Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association, Califor-
nia v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 76-162 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 14,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Smith Affidavit].
60. The prohibition is implied from the ban on the raising of monthly loan payments,
12 C.F.R. § 541.14(a) (1977), and the express grant of authority to use "flexible in-
terest rates," a term defined so as to prohibit upward adjustment of the interest rate.
Id. § 541.14(c).
61. Although residential loans generally have 25 to 30 year terms, the typical Califor-
nia residential loan is paid off in five to ten years. Plaintiff's Opening Argument, Schott
v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 75-366 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 4, 1975).
62. "A mortgage providing for specific payments at stated regular intervals and final
payment of more than twice any of the periodic payments." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY
182 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
63. A short-term amortized loan involves a higher down payment with the lower be-
ginning balance to be paid off in higher installments over a relatively short period of
time.
64. Where market interest rates display an upward trend, a long-term fixed interest
amortized loan will necessarily carry a higher rate of interest than a contemporaneous
loan with a due-on clause, since the interest rate on the amortized loan must approxi-
mate the average prevailing market rate over the life of the loan. Advisory Opinion,
1977]
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The first is prohibited under federal law, 5 the second is impractical
because most borrowers lack sufficient capital, and the third is compe-
titively unfeasible since borrowers would be offered lower rates at the
state associations. 6
In addition, the federal associations have only four primary sources
of revenue, all of which are short-term:"7 savings accounts, advances
authorized by the Board,68 the sale of loans in the secondary mortgage
market,"9 and cash payments on loans.70  Thus, unrestrained exercise
of the due-on clause is the only realistic means available to the federal
associations to realize income at interest levels sufficient to meet the
cost of raising revenue in a rising market. Conversely, if enforceability
of the clause is severely restricted, the associations may be unable to
pay competitive rates on savings accounts and the ensuing decline in
savings would force rates higher on new loans. 71  Consequently, only
the most creditworthy borrowers able to afford a sufficient down pay-
ment or more expensive secondary financing would be able to procure
a residential loan. The greatest impact would be felt by borrowers
most in need of loans-those financing their first home or unable to
afford a substantial down payment.72  Realistically, however, the eco-
nomic ramifications evolving from the limited enforceability of the
clause under California law may prove illusory insofar as there is no
evidence that the effect of Tucker on California associations has been
supra note 46, at 20-24. A loan containing a due-on clause will, on the other hand,
be adjusted to market every five to seven years. See note 61 supra.
65. See note 60 supra.
66. Smith Affidavit, supra note 59.
67. Revenue is used in the sense of a cash flow for which the associations, as bor-
rowers and buyers of cash, must pay market rates. Depending on the source of the
revenue, the market rate is expressed as either an interest or a discount rate. A source
of revenue referred to as "short-term," then, means that current market interest and
discount rates are applied.
In this sense, revenue is to an association what stock-in-trade is to a merchant. To
pursue the analogy further, when the association makes a loan, it is effectively selling
a portion of its revenue and the price of the loan is expressed as the interest rate
charged. The analogy, however, is somewhat imperfect as the merchant's costs as well
as prices are both short-term, while the association's costs and prices reflect industry
predictions as to future market levels.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
69. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
70. Smith Affidavit, supra note 59.
71. Id. One possible solution would be for the associations to merely absorb the
differential, but due to the extensive number of home loans made by the associations,
such practice might well be unrealistic because of the resultant diminished profit mar-
gins.
72. Advisory Opinion, supra note 46, at 39.
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to reduce the number of savings account investors or to impede the
availability of residential loans within the state.
C. The Board's Position
The Board is quite adamant in its position that federal law governs
enforcement of due-on clauses.73 The Board is equally insistent in its
support of the right of the federal associations to invoke the due-on
clause, despite conflicting state law, solely as an interest-raising device.
The Board has maintained in a number of advisory opinions that its long-
standing implied approval is reflected by its knowledge of and refusal
to prohibit such use in annual examinations74 of the federal associations.
Alihough courts generally display "great deference" toward opinions
rendered by regulatory bodies interpreting regulations promulgated by
those bodies,7" such judicial policy is founded upon the circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness inherent in the rule- and policy-making
procedures employed by the agencies.76 While the Board possesses
procedures sufficient to provide such guarantees, 77 Board opinions do
not comply with those procedures, but are instead prepared by staff
attorneys78 at the behest of the associations.79 Indeed, in at least two
instances, courts have found occasion to chide the Board for its "hyper-
technical"80 and one-sided8' interpretations in favor of the industry.
Moreover, the position taken by the Board conflicts with the standing
Board policy against varying the interest rate during the life of the
73. Id.
74. See 12 C.F.R. § 500.3 (1977).
75. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Kupiec v. Republic Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 512 F.2d 147, 151 (7th Cir. 1975).
76. Such guarantees of trustworthiness stem from the expertise of the regulators in
the area, particularly where the issues are beyond the common experience of judges.
See, e.g., Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411
(1959) (the Court directed the trial court to avail itself of the assistance of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to determine the economic ramifications of permitting
common carriers to utilize exculpatory clauses); see also Far East Conference v. United
States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). Resolution of the legal issues involved, however, is solely
the province of the court. Compare Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Termi-
nals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 420-21 (1959), with Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1970); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. V 1975); 12 C.F.R.
§§ 508-509 (1977). The procedures provide for notice to be posted in the Federal Regis-
ter and a hearing afforded interested parties.
78. Interview with Daniel Goldberg, Acting General Counsel, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (Feb. 11, 1977).
79. See note 46 supra.
80. Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 611 (2d Cir. 1967).
81. Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 224 S.E.2d 580, 588 (N.C. 1976).
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loan . 2  Under traditional contract principles, the original borrower
stands guarantor upon the assumption of the loan by the new borrower.83
Thus, the original borrower remains an obligor, albeit secondary, on
the loan and, even though the new borrower pays the installments, the
same "loan" is involved. When the association conditions its assent to
an assumption agreement on the new borrower's acceptance of an in-
creased interest rate, the interest rate has thus effectively been in-
creased during the life of the loan.84 The Due-On Regulation, in an
apparent attempt to sidestep this inconsistency,85 provides that where
the original borrower is relieved of liability upon an increase in the new
borrower's interest rate, the resulting agreement constitutes a separate
and independent agreement.8"
D. Policy Considerations
Resolution of whether exercise of the due-on clause is part of a field
occupied by Congress is inexorably tied to the policy arguments as to
which law, federal or state, ought to apply. That the subject property
lies in the state, that the note and trust deed are executed within the
state, that the enforceability of both are governed by state law,87 that
many federal associations operate exclusively within one state, that the
associations exercise their foreclosure rights pursuant to state law88 all
suggest that state law ought appropriately to govern exercise of the due-
on clause. Moreover, some states, including California, are moving to-
ward outright prohibition of the clause for interest rate adjustment. 80
Thus, should federal law preempt state law, a dual standard of enforce-
ability will result: such use permitted the federal associations, but
denied the state associations.
On the other hand, if federal law is applied, divergent state court
interpretations will be prevented. Since the Board must regulate the
82. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
83. See cases collected 55 AM. JuR. 2d Mortgages § 1036 nn.4 & 5 (1971).
84. Plaintiffs Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Schott v. Mission Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. No. 75-366 (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 4,
1975).
85. Interview with Daniel Goldberg, Acting General Counsel, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (Feb. 11, 1977).
86. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(g)(3) (1977).
87. In California, for example, the statutory scheme is detailed at CAL. CiV. CODE
§§ 2920-2955 (West 1974).
88. In California, for example, the statutory scheme is detailed at CAL. CIV. PRoC.
CODE § 725 (West 1972).
89. See Austin v. Calamars, No. 360231 (Super. Ct. San Diego, Cal., Sept. 16, 1975),
digested in Freshman, Tucker v. Lassen and the Future of Acceleration, 8 U.W.LA.L,
Rnv. 57, 63 (1976); cases collected at notes 98-99 infra,
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federal association in all states, it would be manifestly difficult for the
Board to contend with a plethora of local variations on enforcement of
due-on clauses. 90 Additionally, courts applying federal law would not
be confined to past California decisions, would not be forced to antici-
pate the future policy of California courts in outright sale situations, and
would be free to choose a line of reasoning more conducive to effecting
a nationally uniform policy. The advantage of looking to other juris-
dictions may, however, prove illusory inasmuch as courts in other juris-
dictions are divided both as to the appropriate standards applicable to
due-on clauses and as to the correct theoretical basis upon which to
determine such standards. 91
III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The conclusion that federal regulation of the due-on clause has sup-
planted state regulation does not of itself determine under what circum-
stances the clause may be exercised. Since the Due-On Regulation
purports to regulate only those loan agreements made after July 31,
1976,92 the federal regulatory scheme is silent with respect to loan
agreements made prior to the effective date.9" Under these circum-
stances, pre-July 31, 1976 contracts will be governed by federal com-
mon law; that is, law which utilizes precedent drawn from any juris-
diction having considered the issue. Among such jurisdictions, a
fundamental rift has developed over whether property law principles
relating to unreasonable restraints on alienation or freedom of contract
principles should determine the standards applicable to exercise of the
clause.
In "property" jurisdictions, the courts have erected a variety of
threshold points demarking the quantum of permissible restraint on
alienation. At one extreme lies Crockett v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Association,94 wherein the court took the position that an un-
90. See Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967).
91. See notes 92-106 infra and accompanying text. Division in the courts may be
attributed in part to the relatively recent appearance of the due-on clause as a widely
used interest rate adjustment tool. See Goddard, Non-Assignment Provisions in Land
Contracts, 31 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1932). That the clause became commonplace
during the 1960's is generally attributed to the rapid rise in interest rates which occurred
during that decade. Bonanno, Due On Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate
Financing in California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alter-
natives, 6 U.S.F.L. Rav. 267, 276 (1972).
92. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9 (1977).
93. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
94. 224 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. 1976). In Crockett, plaintiffs had purchased 'a block of
apartment houses from the original borrower under the note (a corporation). Although
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reasonable restraint on alienation arose only where the borrower would
suffer a forfeiture. Since under the terms of the loan agreement the
borrower was afforded the opportunity to avert forfeiture by paying,
without prepayment penalties, the balance due on the loan upon
transfer, no forfeiture could occur if the agreement were complied
with; hence, any attendant restraint on alienation was reasonable. 5
In most jurisdictions, courts have more realistically balanced the
lender's purpose in exercising the clause against the borrower's inter-
est in alienation. 6 These jurisdictions, in turn, have divided over
whether the lender's desire to increase the interest rate will preponderate
over the borrower's interest in alienation,9 7 or whether the lender must
the association had not exercised the acceleration clause upon the initial conveyance,
the clause was invoked when the plaintiffs later attempted to convey the property to
prospective borrowers who were already members of First Federal. The association
stipulated that there was no risk of impairment of security interest since the prospective
purchasers were already approved borrowers under another note from the association,
that there was no risk of waste inherent in the transfer of the property, and that the
plaintiffs would remain primarily liable on the note. Although the issue thus presented
was whether the lender had a right to condition assent to the transfer solely to exact
a higher interest rate, the court couched its ruling in terms which would permit far
greater restraints on alienation.
Although ignored by the court, the failure of the lender to exercise its rights upon
learning of the first conveyance has been viewed by other courts as raising potential
defenses for the borrower. Chief among these is laches, inasmuch as foreclosure is
a proceeding in equity. At least one court has suggested that laches is available if
the borrower can show that the lender had knowledge of and acquiesced in the transfer,
exercised unreasonable delay in foreclosing, or if the borrower was unnecessarily preju-
diced by the delay. See Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works,
205 N.W.2d 762 (Wis. 1973), aff'd after remand, 239 N.W.2d 20 (Wis. 1976).
95. 224 S.E.2d at 584. Since the loan involved the purchase of commercial property,
the decision may be inapplicable to the purchase of a single-family residence inasmuch
as the court stressed the absence of unfairness; the court, however, was silent on the
point.
96. Typical of cases employing this approach is Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 333 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1975), wherein the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the right
of the lender to increase interest rates upon the initial borrower's execution of an install-
ment sale contract and the transfer of possession without the written consent of the
lender. The court relied almost exclusively on property law in determining that the
lender's purpose of avoiding an impairment of security interest in transfer of the prop-
erty was sufficient in itself to allow invocation of the clause. By balancing "the utility
of the restraint as compared with the injurious consequences that will flow from its
enforcement," the court held that the restraint was reasonable. Id. at 3. See also Gale
v. York Center Community Coop., Inc., 171 N.E.2d 30 (Ill. 1960).
97. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1973); First
Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 550 P.2d 1271 (Nev. 1976); Shalit v, Investors Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 244 A.2d 151 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Instit.,
63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1970); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn.
1973).
We do not consider the motive of Midland in seeking to protect itself and the
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make an affirmative showing that the assuming party is a less desirable
credit risk than the original borrower or that the likelihood of waste
has been enhanced,9 8 even in the case of outright saleY9
In "contract" jurisdictions, courts have invalidated the clause by nar-
rowly construing language in the loan agreement.100 For example, the
absence of specific language allowing the lender to accelerate in order
to raise interest rates has been held an insufficient ground upon which
to invoke the lender's acceleration rights, since the clause "merely
permits the lender to approve or disapprove the transfer and contains
no authority entitling the mortgagee to vary the interest rate."'u0 Simi-
larly, language which authorized acceleration "[i]f a conveyance
should be made by the Mortgagor. . . without the written consent of
the Mortgagee, and without assumption. . . by the grantee of the obli-
borrower from the effects of inflationary or deflationary conditions in the money
market to be improper or unlawful. Both parties have the benefit of their original
bargain during their continued creditor-debtor relationship. However, when the
property is sold to a purchaser who desires to assume the existing loan, economic
consideration may reasonably justify the lender in raising the interest rate to ...
the current market rate.
Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra at 1245.
98. Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1974); La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d
1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971); Demey v. Joujon-Rouche, 63 Cal. App. 3d 178, 133
Cal. Rptr. 618 (1976).
99. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 490 P.2d 328 (Utah 1971); Mutual Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 223 N.W.2d 921 (Wis. 1974);
see also notes 101-02 infra and accompanying text.
100. California courts have generally avoided reference to contract law in refusing
to enforce the clause, relying instead on property principles. Nevertheless, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal held in MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp.,
27 Cal. App. 3d 170, 103 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1972), that a clause in a trust deed providing
for the right of sale in case of default was enforceable and that the form documents
prepared by the lending institution were not contracts of adhesion, per se. Since issues
relating to foreclosure on real property have traditionally been resolved on property
principles, the MCA decision may portend a trend toward evaluation of other property
related issues in terms of contract law. See generally 55 AM. Jun. 2d Mortgages §§
679-779 (1971).
101. Lane v. Bisceglia, 488 P.2d 474, 476 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971). In Baltimore
Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 486 P.2d 190 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971), the court, although acknowl-
edging the validity of the clause, refused automatic enforcement because the lender's
purpose for increasing the interest rate was deemed unreasonable:
In the opinion of this Court the better view is that the parties to a mortgage
and note may enter into such agreements as they deem necessary to the transac-
tion of their business. Acceleration clauses are bargained-for elements of mort-
gages and notes, protecting the mortgagee from the risks connected with transfers.
The underlying reason for an acceleration clause of the type before us is to insure
that a responsible party is in possession, thus protecting the mortgagee from unan-
ticipated risks .... mhe invocation of the clause must be based on grounds that
are reasonable on their face.
Id. at 192-93.
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gation" was held to constitute a condition consisting of dual elements,
both of which were required to occur before the lender's rights would
take effect.'
0 2
Other courts have upheld exercise of the clause upon a showing that
no fraud, coercion, or overreaching was present. 103 A fortiori, in cases
involving sophisticated borrowers acting with the assistance of counsel,
courts have consistently permitted exercise of the clause to exact an
increased interest rate.10 4  Decisions in which the essential fairness of
the bargain is stressed suggest that if unfairness were present, exercise
of the clause would be denied. Such unfairness may follow from a
showing that the due-on clause forms part of a contract of adhesion. 105
An adhesion contract arises where a contract offered to the public bears
the following characteristics: the parties are of disparate bargaining
power, the contract is embodied in a standardized form, all competitor
organizations employ similar clauses, and consumers lack knowledge or
understanding of the import of the provision. 06
The due-on clause would seem to fall within the designated tests as
applied to the ordinary consumer insofar as the loan instruments are
102. Home Fed. Say. & Loan As'n v. English, 249 So. 2d 707, 708-09 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971).
103. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 333 N.E.2d 1 (111. 1975);
People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 406 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970);
Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 545 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1976); Mutual
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 239 N.W.2d 20 (Wis. 1976).
104. Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 224 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. 1976).
105. Although no case has yet decided whether the contract-of-adhesion concept is
a component of federal common law, the United States Supreme Court has suggested
that exculpatory clauses in contracts may be avoided under federal law on public policy
grounds. See Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 369 U.S.
411 (1959). Since avoidance on grounds of a contract of adhesion is but a particu-
larized application of avoidance on public policy grounds, it would seem that the con-
tract-of-adhesion principle forms part of federal common law.
106. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). The majority
of due-on clause cases have involved purchasers of commercial property or of apparent
sophistication and the courts have therefore discussed only tangentially aspects of ad-
hesion contracts. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 333 N.E.2d I
(Ill. 1976) (absent "unconscionable or inequitable conduct of the lender," borrower
could not claim that higher interest rate was unreasonable, id. at 5); Crockett v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 224 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. 1976) ("in the absence of .. . proof
that the lender acted fraudulently, inequitably, oppressively, or unconscionably," exercise
of the clause was neither invalid nor unreasonable, id. at 586); Miller v. Pacific First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 545 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1976) (absent a showing that enforceabil-
ity of the clause would be "inequitable under the circumstances," clause was legitimately
invoked, id. at 549); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 205
N.W.2d 762 (Wis. 1973), aff'd alter remand, 239 N.W.2d 20 (Wis. 1976) (absent a
showing that the demand for an increased interest rate was "unconscionable or over-
reaching," clause was enforceable, id. at 24).
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standardized forms typically unaltered by the borrower. Since the
clause generally appears buried within the other provisions of the loan
agreement, the borrower's attention is not focused on the clause. More-
over, since most borrowers purchase the property without the assistance
of counsel, they presumably fail to comprehend the full ramifications
of assumption, acceleration, and foreclosure concepts. Finally, the
clause is present in the instruments of virtually all lending institutions.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the recent promulgation of the Due-On Regulation, federal
preemption of the due-on clause is a virtual certainty, particularly as
to loan instruments executed after July 31, 1976. Moreover, if federal
common law is applied to loans executed prior to that date, the in-
creasing number of jurisdictions adhering to a per se standard for exer-
cise of the clause may render Tucker a minority decision.
These recent developments, however, will probably do little to ter-
minate the controversy surrounding the due-on clause. The muddled
language of the Due-On Regulation relating to its exceptions to per se
enforceability, the meaning of its effective date, and the precatory dis-
closure provisions concerning the meaning and effect of the clause0 7 may
well breed new controversies.
Because the state, but not the federal associations are permitted the
use of the variable interest rate, the more liberal due-on clause enforce-
ment rights afforded the federal associations tend to balance the avail-
able lending tools between the federal and state associations. If fed-
eral associations are, as is likely, also permitted use of the variable
interest rate, that balance will be upset. If, however, consumers appre-
ciate the import of the more restricted ability of the state associations
to enforce the due-on clause as opposed to their federal counterparts,
state associations may experience increased loan activity. Thus, the
brouhaha over federal preemption may prove to be so much tilting
at windmills, as one effect cancels out another until the situation after
preemption is indistinguishable from the situation before.
Kathy Agan Knox
107. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,286 (1976).
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